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of Haskins and Sells
Former Accountant-General of the Reparation Commission
Author of "The Dawes Plan and the New Economics."

FIRST GENERAL SESSION

Address Delivered at
Fifteenth National Foreign Trade Convention
Houston, Texas, April 25, 26, 27, 1928

T H E PROSPECT IN E U R O P E
By G E O R G E P.

AULD

of Haskins and Sells
Former Accountant-General of the Reparation Commission;
Author of "The Dawes Plan and the New Economics."

The program assigns me a subject of fascinating vagueness, but
my real topic is the reparation and inter-ally debt question, with particular reference to the so-called transfer problem.
It is nearly four years since the Dawes plan ushered in a real
peace and made possible the resumption of normal processes of production and trade. Within that period, there has been a striking
improvement in European conditions. But the time has been too
short for any such substantial and permanent improvement to have
occurred as would warrant the idea that the plan has completed its
service to mankind. Its continued successful operation remains a
matter of vital consequence to the political and economic stability of
Europe, and thus, as one does not need to emphasize in this company, of large immediate importance to us in America.
The inter-ally debt settlements have an importance of a different
kind. Except in the case of England, the period of large instalment
payments has not yet arrived and the question of their direct economic
effects is still one of the future. The settlements have, however, a
large present significance in the influence which they exert on the
reparation question. Simplifications of the machinery of the Dawes
plan are now being suggested, having as desirable features the definite
fixation of the German liability and the commercialization of the debt
through the sale of reparation bonds to the world investing public
for the benefit of the allies. But these suggestions are invariably
linked with a proposal that Germany's obligation be fixed at a
figure considerably lower than the estimated value of the present
annuities, and a serious stumbling block immediately appears in the
debts owed by the allies to this country. So long as those obligations in their present magnitude hang over the allies, it does not seem
likely that we shall see any important revision of the plan involving
further concessions to Germany.
N o r , in my view, is further concession by the allies necessary,
either equitably or from an economic standpoint. The burdens resting on the allies are no less than those on Germany; and the idea
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that the reparation debt (or the inter-ally debts) must be reduced
because of difficulties to be encountered in transferring payments
across frontiers is without substantiation.
The record of the Dawes plan to date is one of unqualified success.
Its prospects, fundamentally, are of the best. It is powerfully supported by public opinion, which, as we all know, is today much better
informed and far more potent in international affairs than ever before in history. Public opinion is reasonably clear, and properly so,
that the burden placed on Germany by the Dawes plan is an equitable
one, that it is not based on the idea of revenge and that it has no
reference to the tangled question of responsibility for the war. The
burden is laid in the interest of a fair distribution of the war losses
among all the nations of Europe, no one of which could undertake
to carry a disproportionate load without involving all of them in the
common danger of collapse. The French are pinning their hopes of
rehabilitation to the Dawes plan; and the Germans, under the intelligent leadership of men like M a r x , Stresemann and Luther, are
able to recognize the benefits of political stability and economic reconstruction which the plan confers on Germany itself.
The Dawes plan is morally well grounded; and it was an advantageous settlement for all concerned. A t bottom, therefore, it
is sound and vigorous. W e are told, however, by a school of
English economists, that the plan is impractical. It works, but
the Keynes school tells us that it cannot continue to work when
the period of maximum payments arrives this fall. It is a fair
and advantageous arrangement, drawn up, accepted and supported by
reasonable and intelligent men. But the economists tell us that
there is an economic law with which a settlement of such a character is in conflict, and which will compel the plan to give up the
ghost. T h e y tell us of a new economic something recently
come into the laws of international exchange, called the transfer
problem, which prevents a willing and solvent debtor from paying
or a willing and needy creditor from receiving, without harm to
himself, the installments on any international debt as large as the
reparation debt.
This so-called transfer problem has been made the basis of
repeated warnings to the French that they must reduce their reparation claims. The annuities provided under the Dawes plan I
estimate have a capitalized value of nine billion dollars. Roughly
half of the obligation runs to France. The French need the relief
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which it represents. Their struggle for fiscal and economic regeneration is scarcely yet out of its initial chapter, and they are wholly
unreconciled to the idea of a stoppage of reparation payments.
They take no stock in the transfer problem. They are deeply impressed by the view that if reparation payments should be suspended by the Transfer Committee, such action would occur not
as a consequence of any inherent economic difficulty, but as a
result of this very transfer agitation itself.
There can be no doubt that the predictions of a breakdown,
unsubstantial though they are intrinsically, would tend, if given
credence, to bring about that very catastrophe, just as the spread
of unfounded rumors in the street has been known to cause a disastrous run on the deposits of a bank. There is a close similarity
between the two cases. F o r the Dawes plan functions in a very
real and definite sense as a part of the world credit system. Its
operation today depends on the American investor. It is the dollar
exchange being made available to Germany through American loans
which furnishes the means of transferring the payments out of Germany. This process, at the present stage of the reconstruction of
Europe, is a wholly natural and healthy one for all concerned, and
in normal conditions it seems due to go on for a long time to come.
But the Keynes school is determined that the American investor shall
believe it to be a dangerous and unnatural process. If the investor
should take these ideas seriously and stop loaning our surplus capital
to Europe, the result undoubtedly would be a political and commercial
crisis of considerable proportions, affecting this country, as well as
Europe. The discoverers of the transfer problem are playing with
forces of a highly explosive nature, both economic and political, and
their ideas ought to be clearly recognized and tagged for what they
are, a body of doctrinaire theory possessing no solid foundation.
These theories have had a considerable success with the man in
the street. Under their influence former standards of judgment regarding the creation and payment of debts have become dowdy and
old-fashioned. Those old standards, possessed of a certain fundamental simplicity and tested by long experience, regarded taxable
capacity as the criterion relating to the creation and payment of government debt and industrial earning power as the criterion for commercial debt. But since the war, we have talked a new language—a
kind of economic jargon. Nothing now seems to us worth noticing
but the export surplus, failing to possess which, the debtor, we have
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been told, cannot pay, and succeeding in possessing which he will,
by paying, bring serious embarrassment or ruin to the industrial life
of the creditor nation.
O f such stuff is modern economic theory made. F o r nearly a
decade the spectre of the export surplus has dominated the minds
alike of those who have feared that the debts could not be paid and
of those who feared that they would be paid. A n economic law has
been discovered, which though it did not operate at all before the
war, is now said to operate with remorseless finality. It is a law
which now runs to the disqualification of France as the principal
creditor on reparation account and of the United States as the chief
creditor on inter-ally and commercial loan accounts, but which, in
pre-war days, when England was creditor on world account in nearly
twice the amount of the present position of the United States, did
not run at all.
Today, Europe and the rest of the world owe us on commercial
debt about nine billion dollars (net after deducting American obligations owed to abroad); and on inter-ally debt, about seven billion
dollars (representing the real present value of the annuities contemplated by the funding agreements, if capitalized at four per cent).
The total is 16 billion dollars, the difference in the character of the
two major components of this indebtedness being immaterial, so far
as any possible difficulties of transfer are concerned. A s against this
16 billion dollars owed to the United States at the present time, the
United States and the rest of the world before the war owed Europe
the equivalent of 50 billion dollars in present day values (our share
being 7 ½ billions). Thirty billion dollars of this debt was owed
to England alone and most of the remainder to France and Germany.
N o w what happened in the matter of international debt collection
in those pre-war years? What happened was that every solvent
debtor paid his debts without difficulty to himself or anyone else, and
every English investor who held foreign obligations of good credit
rating regularly cashed his coupons and duly deposited his collections
of matured principal in a sterling bank account or any other kind of
a bank account in which he saw fit to place them. Individually, every
good debt was collected in cash; the aggregate of the foreign lendings, however, never decreased. It increased steadily, other requirements of the industries of debtor countries taking the place of the
obligations which were paid off. Nothing untoward happened in the
realm of economic law, and the transfer problem was unheard of.
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What new factor has, since the war, been introduced into the situation to change all this? What, if anything, has made the international economic system of the past suddenly sinister or unworkable?
The answer is, of course, nothing at all. A l l that has happened is
that Country X which was a creditor is now a debtor and Country Y
which was a debtor is now a creditor. The transfer problem is nothing but a state of mind. When the inter-ally debts were suddenly
and dramatically created in the amount of 10 billion dollars, 200 or
300 million people looked at them and gasped, and of that number
not one-tenth of one percent had ever heard of the 50 billion dollars
of foreign obligations (33 billions in pre-war values) which Europe
had held in 1913. A legend of impossibility and danger was then
and there created, which grew and spread and came to be widely
accepted by many who have never to this day applied to it the critical
test of experience and common sense.
The fact is that international debts normally never have been paid
by means of an export surplus. International debts arise solely as a
consequence of the fact that the debtor countries possess no export
surplus; and over long periods of years they are paid, as they mature,
by the creation of fresh debt. Nothing could be more natural, more
healthy or more profitable for all concerned than the working out
of this cycle of world distribution of capital. A n d nothing has been
passed over in more complete silence by that school of British economists who looked at the inter-ally debts and solemnly pronounced
them impossible.
The world is divided at any given time into natural debtor countries and natural creditor countries. A natural debtor country is one
whose current needs for capital for internal development or reconstruction exceed its annual savings—thus the United States before
the war and Europe today. A natural creditor country is one whose
current needs for capital at home are less than its annual savings-—
thus Europe before the war and the United States today. A n d the
index of these needs lies in interest rates. Capital follows interest
rates as the tides follow the moon. It is obedient to the law of
supply and demand; and so today our surplus capital, the product of
our industries, loaned abroad by our investors, is flowing across the
Atlantic in a steady stream.
This movement of the capital of a creditor country, these shipments of its surplus production constitute the only authentic export
surplus known to the international economic system—the export sur-
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plus which a natural creditor nation inevitably has and which a
natural debtor nation inevitably has not. The authentic export surplus moves not from but to the debtor nation. A f t e r the primary
exchanges of goods against goods have taken place to the full extent
of the natural debtor country's exports, the secondary movement of
trade takes place—that significant movement of the export surplus
of the natural creditor against securities of the natural debtor, profitably employing the excess productive capacity of the creditor and
building up the deficient capacity of the debtor. In this manner, and
in this manner only, are international debts (on balance) created, and,
so long as the debtor remains a natural debtor, are the interest and
sinking fund charges on them settled.
F o r ten years British economists have been dinning into our ears
that Germany and the allies cannot within a considerable time be expected to develop an export surplus. This demonstration has been
a work of supererogation, for it is obvious that Europe's losses cut
untold billions deep into her productive powers, as measured by plant,
good will and manpower. But the idea that without an export surplus
those countries cannot settle their international balances in a wholly
natural way for an indefinite period has nothing to support it.
Trade and finance under the modern system and on the modern
scale came into being in the last century, and throughout that century
the normal and only method of payment of international debts was
through refunding, not in detail, but in the aggregate. Never, except
on the abnormal occasion of a complete world overturn and then only
for the four years duration of the overturning process were international debts ever settled through an export surplus. That occasion
was when, under the stimulus of an unheard of war demand and after
years of intensive development as a debtor nation, the United States
took its new position in the world, settled its accumulated balance by
a huge export of goods to Europe, and created a balance of 10 billion
dollars on the other side of the account. Normally, international
capital balances are never finally settled at all, any more than are the
deposits of the banks or the obligations of the railroads. Once only
in history has such a settlement of international balances ever taken
place, and then only at the end of a cycle—the end, so far as we can
now see, of the cycle of European economic supremacy and the beginning of the cycle of American supremacy.
The aggregate indebtedness keeps piling up. Individual debts are
paid, but new ones, on an increasing scale, commensurate with the
8

expansion of population and the natural growth of business, take
their place. The dollar exchange created by the new loans takes care
of the old loans and finances new American exports. A n d so the
process goes on in this new world job of ours, which England once
performed. This expansion, the English tell us, is dangerous to the
United States. But I have yet to hear any sensible reason advanced
why it is dangerous or why it cannot go on indefinitely to levels
scarcely yet dreamed of. A n d , as a practical matter, at the present
rate of increase, which for the year 1926 was about 700 million dollars, net after offsets for money loaned to us, it will be 50 years before we arrive at that position which European manufacturers and
investors held in world trade and finance in 1913.
It seems to me that on the evidence, we may safely conclude that
those who have feared that the debts, whether reparation, inter-ally,
or commercial, cannot be paid because the debtor countries will not
have an export surplus, have been unnecessarily concerned. For, so
long as the debtor countries have no export surplus, they will be in
the market for new foreign loans, and the debts will be paid by the
new loans. A n d , when, by the aid of the loans and other natural
recuperative processes, those countries have built up their productivity and come to the point of being natural creditor nations, with
export surpluses of their own, the debts will then be paid by means
of export surpluses. Obviously, a nation must either have an export
surplus or not have one, and under neither condition has any economic law of attainder running against creditors ever yet been passed.
W i t h the same facts in mind regarding the world ebb and flow
of surplus capital there is, I think, a brief and relatively simple answer to the apprehensions of those who fear that the debts owing to
us will some day be collected by means of a European export surplus
and that our industries will be buried under the influx. The picture
which they draw of a huge increase in our imports brought about by
the pressure of debts seeking to be paid, is nothing more than a figment of the imagination. The debts, whether they be big or little
will be a merely passive factor in the situation.
If, in the future, we should become a natural debtor country by
comparison with Europe, that is to say, needing capital more acutely
than Europe and accordingly offering higher interest return for it,
that condition will not arise for reasons connected with the existence
of the debts nor will its degree be at all proportionate with their size.
It will arise, if it arises at all, from the need of more capital at home
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and it will presumably be satisfied in the first instance by keeping
our export surplus at home, and after that, if we need still more
capital, by demanding Europe's surplus. In such circumstances, our
industries will be crying for capital, they will be crying for increased
productivity, and the resulting import of capital goods, which industry
itself will voluntarily stimulate by offering high interest rates, will
serve the dual purpose of providing new capital and of supplementing
a shortage of home product. In this process, the debts will be collected against the deficiency in our export balances, but they will have
no part in creating that deficiency. When this condition begins to
run, we shall be collecting the debts by exporting the evidences of debt,
and, so far as I can see, the only significance which the size of the
debts will have will be that the more foreign obligations which we
hold, the longer will it be before we begin to export our own obligations in settlement of our adverse current balances.
The sum and substance of the matter, so far as supposed dangers
of debt collection in goods are concerned, is this: That i f we do in
the future decrease our exports and increase our imports it will be
for reasons unrelated to the debts and connected solely with the matter of capital supply and demand, in circumstances which we in the
past as a debtor nation and Europe in the present as a debtor continent have found to be thoroughly healthy and stimulating.
But who is there who thinks that this situation is going to arise
soon or suddenly? Whether its possibilities relate only to the satisfaction of natural and complementary demands of the nations concerned, or whether they contain also elements of danger, we may
safely agree with the economists as to the unlikelihood of Europe's
soon producing an export surplus. Can we not then for the present
enjoy at its full artistic value, without indulging in too many anticipatory shivers, their thrilling depiction of what will one day
happen when American industry in the role of Little R e d Riding
Hood comes face to face with the ugly fangs of Europe's E x p o r t
Surplus?
Naturally, by our loans we are building up the productive strength
of our competitors. But shall we be frightened by our own prosperity? If we wish to trade and prosper today we cannot help benefiting Europe by the rich and fertile overflow of our surplus, even
if we would. A n d if as a nation we would prevent it if we could,
we should be guilty of the twin stupidities of failing to recognize
Europe as more of a customer than a competitor and of failing to
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understand that the healthy activity even of a competitor builds
wider markets everywhere for all.
A s for the inter-ally debts, it is too late to consider them at all in
such a significance. If they conserved Europe's basic productivity
by helping to preserve Europe's liberties that was all done and completed a decade ago when the loans were made. A n d it would be
ridiculous for us to cancel them for fear of the hobgoblin labelled
dangers of repayment. It is inconceivable that the American people
would be willing to place themselves in history as the butts of such
a colossal hoax. If we decide to reduce the debts further we ought
to do it on grounds creditable to our intelligence and meriting the
respect of the world, as an act of human forbearance,. of political
sagacity and, as I see it, of business sense. I am not here to argue
revision of the debt settlements, I should like merely to suggest that
the real outlines of the question have so far been obscured by a fog
of pseudo economic doctrine. When that is cleared away, we shall
perhaps be able to consider whether it is worth our while i n spiritual
satisfaction to secure the good will of Europe's overburdened taxpayers, and whether an increase in their purchasing power would be
profitably reflected in our export trade.
Whatever our decisions on this and other questions related to the
subject of international debts we might appropriately celebrate our
entry into wider fields of world affairs by declaring our independence
of doctrinaire economics and assinging a somewhat higher value, than
is now the fashion, to judgments based on experience.
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